







derstands  itself  as  a  fundamental  discipline  of  the  
critique	of	social	abstractions,	which	works	out	the	
justification	 of	 the	wrongness	of	 the	bourgeois	life	
context,	 which	 is	 in	 the	 Critique  of  the  political  
economics  only presupposed or  left  out  by Marx.”  
(p.	13)	
The	book	presupposes	 that	Marxs’	work	can	
accomplish  more  than  stay  at  the  level  of  
“marxisms”.	 Marxist	 philosophy	 must	 turn	
into  an  abstract-critical  concrete  philosophy  








Consciousness is a timeless and central topic 
in	philosophy,	especially	as	it	pertains	to	the	
mind-body	problem.	While,	on	the	one	hand,	
the existence of consciousness is a truth that 
is	 certain	 to	us,	on	 the	other	hand,	 the	natu-
re  of  consciousness  seems  to  be  radically  
different  in  kind from the  nature  of  physical  
matter.	How,	 then,	 are	we	 to	 understand	 the	
relation	between	first-person	subjective	expe-
rience  and  the  third-person  physical  world?  
The	physicalist	 suggests	 that	every	property,	
including	 mentality,	 supervenes	 on	 some	
physical	 property.	 Against	 this	 view,	 some	
philosophers  have  commented  on  the  failure  
of physical science to account for the reality 
of	subjective	experience.	The	dualist,	therefo-
re,	states	that	physicalism	is	false	and	instead	
endorses the philosophical thesis that conscio-
usness is a fundamental entity that is ontolo-
gically distinct from physical matter. Squaring 
up	to	the	challenge	of	the	mind-body	problem,	
Philip	Goff’s	book,	Consciousness and Fun-
damental  Reality,	 is	 an	 engaging	 work	 in	
speculative metaphysics that  seeks to offer a 
somewhat different view.
Goff is perhaps most well known as a defen-
der	 of	 panpsychism,	 which	 is	 the	 view	 that	
mentality  is  ubiquitous  in  the  natural  world.  
His preferred version of panpsychism in this 
book	is	cosmopsychism,	which	suggests	that	
the  universe  itself  instantiates  some  form  of  
mentality. Since he takes consciousness to be 
irreducible	 and	 fundamental,	 he	 agrees	with	
the dualist and disagrees with the physicalist. 
However,	he	is	disinclined	to	concede	fully	to	
dualism,	 which	 he	 considers	 as	 providing	 a	
disunified	picture	of	the	world.	Rather,	he	sug-
gests that his panpsychism is a form of neutral 
monism	which	 has	 been	 termed	 “Russellian	
monism”,	 although	 it	 is	 contested	 whether	
Bertrand	Russell	fully	supported	this	view.
The	book	is	structured	in	two	parts.	In	the	first	
part	 of	 the	 book,	 Goff	 presents	 a	 refutation	
of  physicalism.  He  discusses  some  establis-
hed	 arguments	 against	 physicalism,	 namely	
Frank	 Jackson’s	 knowledge	 argument	 and	
David	 Chalmers’	 conceivability	 argument.	
While	Goff	sees	merits	in	these	arguments,	he	
does not think they are wholly satisfactory in 
their  traditional  forms.  He  concedes  that  the  
knowledge argument successfully demonstra-
tes an epistemological gap between physicali-
ty	and	phenomenality,	but	contends	that	more	
is  needed  to  make  this  into  a  metaphysical  
gap.  He also considers  the conceivability  ar-
gument,	as	 traditionally	presented,	 to	be	 tro-
ublesome  because  it  invokes  a  contentious  
two-dimensional  semantic  framework.  To  
make	 these	 arguments	 successful,	 Goff	 pro-
poses that we need to appeal to the notion of 
phenomenal	 transparency.	A	 concept,	 he	 sti-
pulates,	is	transparent	“just	in	case	it	reveals	
the	nature	of	the	entity	it	refers	to,	in	the	sense	
that it is a priori (for someone possessing the 
concept  and  in  virtue  of  possessing  the  con-
cept)	what it is for that entity to be part of re-
ality”.	Phenomenal	 transparency,	 then,	 is	 the	
notion	 that	“phenomenal	concepts	 reveal	 the	
nature  of  the  conscious  states  they  refer  to”.  
Goff uses this notion of phenomenal transpa-
rency to  modify  the  conceivability  argument  
into a version which he considers to be more 
successful  at  undermining physicalism.  Take 
P	 to	be	a	physical	fact	such	as	C-fibre	 firing	
and Q  to  be  an  associated  phenomenal  fact  
such  as  the  experience  of  pain.  According  
to	 the	modified	 conceivability	 argument,	 the	
conceivability	 of	 “P  and  not  Q”  entails  the  
possibility	of	“P and not Q”	because	“P” and 
“Q”  are  independent  concepts  that  are  both  
transparent.
However,	 Goff’s	 refutation	 of	 physicalism	
does not stop here. Although he suggests that 
the  notion  of  phenomenal  transparency  en-
hances	 the	 conceivability	 argument,	 he	 also	
proposes that the notion of phenomenal tran-





argument against type identity physicalism. A 
subject	experiencing	a	given	phenomenal	sta-
te forms a direct phenomenal concept of that 
state,	which	captures	the	type	to	which	the	sta-
te belongs and knowledge that the token state 
exists.	 In	 conjunction	with	 physicalism,	 this	
would	 suggest	 that	 the	 subject	 experiencing	
the  phenomenal  state  accesses  the  supposed  
physical	basis	of	that	state,	but	this	is	not	the	
case.	Therefore,	physicalism	is	false.	As	Goff	




is apparent to our understanding that these are 
not the same thing”.
In	the	second	part	of	the	book,	Goff	offers	a	
defence  of  his  preferred  version  of  panpsy-
chism. This follows several  steps.  He begins 
by	suggesting	that	his	view	is	a	form	of	“Ru-
ssellian  monism”.  This  appeals  to  the  obser-
vation that physical science only captures the 
dispositional	properties	of	things,	but	not	their	
intrinsic natures. The descriptions of these dis-
positional properties indicate how these thin-
gs are disposed to act in space and time but do 
not characterise what these things are like in 
themselves.	 	According	to	Goff,	these	dispo-
sitional properties are the physical properties 
of	the	world,	while	the	intrinsic	properties	are	
the phenomenal properties. Goff is clear that 
his	view	 is	not	a	 form	of	physicalism,	and	 I	
think	 that	 this	 is	a	 reasonable	analysis,	 inas-
much  as  his  view acknowledges  that  pheno-
menal facts are not exhausted by the physical 
facts.	However,	as	I	will	later	argue,	his	view	
cannot  hold  up  a  coherent  form  of  monism.  
Rather,	 I	 suggest	 that	 his	 view	 ultimately	
collapses back into a form of dualism.
After	 explicating	 his	 “Russellian	 monism”,	
Goff	 distinguishes	 two	 versions,	 which	 are	
panpsychism  and  panprotopsychism.  While  
panpsychism posits  that  phenomenal  proper-
ties  are  ubiquitous  and  fundamental  in  the  
world,	 panprotopsychism	 suggests	 that	 there	
are	protophenomenal	properties,	which	them-
selves are not mental but can give rise to men-
tality  in  certain  circumstances.  Goff  prefers  
the	 panpsychist	 version	 and	 rejects	 the	 pan-
protopsychist	 version.	 Panprotopsychism,	 he	
argues,	is	an	incomplete	picture	of	the	world	
that	 resigns	 us	 to	 noumenalism.	 Moreover,	
he  suggests  that  panpsychism  is  preferable  
to  panprotopsychism  for  the  reason  of  sim-
plicity.	 In	addition	 to	 the	above,	 I	argue	 that	
there is a more fundamental problem with the 
panprotopsychist version. Given that panpro-





arguments that are used to refute physicalism 
can  also  be  used  to  show  that  panprotopsy-
chism is false.
Having  defended  his  preference  for  panpsy-
chism,	 Goff	 discusses	 the	 combination	 pro-
blem,	 which	 he	 acknowledges	 as	 a	 serious	
problem for  panpsychism.  This  concerns  the  
apparent  impossibility  of  combining  multi-
ple	microsubjects	into	a	single	macrosubject.	
Goff proposes that this is underpinned by the 
subject	irreducibility	thesis,	which	states	that	
“what	it	is	for	there	to	be	a	conscious	subject	
S cannot be analysed into facts not involving 
S”.	That	 is	 to	 say,	 a	 deflationary	 analysis	 of	
subjecthood	 is	 impossible.	 This	 sounds	 bro-
adly	correct,	and	I	propose	that	it	can	be	un-
derstood  further  by  examining  the  nature  of  





ge	 that	 first-person	 subjectivity	 is	 what	 is	
essential	to	consciousness,	such	that	conscio-
usness  necessarily  entails  the  existence  of  a  




first-person	 individuation	 that	subjecthood	 is	
discrete.	 For	 example,	 the	 experiences	 whi-
ch you and I have when we both gaze at the 
same red screen may resemble each other  in 
terms	of	their	qualitative	characters,	but	they	
are  fundamentally  distinct  from  each  other  
in	 virtue	 of	 the	 first-person	 perspectives	 to	
which  they  are  respectively  individuated.  A  
macrosubject	whose	experience	encompasses	
the contents of both of our experiences would 
not	 comprise	 a	 combination	 of	 your	 subject	
and	my	subject	but	would	be	another	distinct	
subject	with	 its	own	first-person	 individuati-




Goff takes the combination problem to refute 
a  version  of  panpsychism called  constitutive  
micropsychism,	which	suggests	that	principal	
bearers  of  mental  properties  are  subatomic  
particles or the smallest regions of spacetime. 
Instead,	 he	 defends	 a	 version	 called	 cosmo-
psychism,	suggesting	that	the	principal	bearer	
of mentality is the universe itself. His defen-
ce  relies  on  a  purported  distinction  between  
grounding by subsumption and grounding by 
analysis.	According	to	Goff,	X can be groun-
ded in Y and Y can be a unity of which X is an 
aspect,	even	if	Y does not entail what is essen-





aspect,	 even	 if	 the	mentality	of	 the	universe	




distinction between grounding by subsump-
tion and grounding by analysis obtains in the 
sort of scenario required by cosmopsychism. 
In the sort of scenario where Y encompasses 
the  totality  of  fundamental  facts  and  X  is  a  
nonfundamental	 fact,	 it	 is	 usual	 to	 say	 that	
X  is  grounded in Y  and also that  X  is  a pri-
ori entailed by Y.	Hence,	grounding	by	sub-
sumption  is  coextensive  with  grounding  by  
analysis.	 Second,	 cosmopsychism	 does	 not	
overcome	the	issue	regarding	the	first-person	
individuation	of	subjecthood.	As	mentioned	
above,	what	 is	 essential	 to	 subjective	 expe-
rience  is  being  individuated  to  a  particular  
first-person	 point	 of	 view.	 This	 first-person	
individuation	 defines	 the	 unique	 identity	 of	
a	 given	 subject	 and	makes	 it	 a	 discrete	 ex-
periential  unit  that  is  essentially  partitioned 
from	other	subjects,	individuated	to	different	
first-person	 perspectives.	 Accordingly,	 the	
claim	that	subjects	could	blend	to	comprise	a	
single	unity	is	nonsensical,	as	such	blending	
is made impossible by the discrete character 
of	 first-person	 individuation.	 Likewise,	 the	
related	claim	that	a	macrosubject	could	split	
into	smaller	microsubjects	is	nonsensical,	as	
such splitting is also made impossible by the 
discrete	 character	 of	 first-person	 individua-






selves  the  principal  bearers  of  phenomenal  








concerning  the  underlying  metaphysics  of  
Goff’s	 panpsychism.	 The	 first	 critical	 point	
is that it is untenable to interpret his view as 
a	 form	of	monism.	As	noted	above,	his	ver-
sion  of  panpsychism  posits  that  the  basic  
ingredients  of  reality  are  intrinsic  (phenom-
enal)	 properties	 and	 dispositional	 (physical)	
properties,	 which	 are	 mutually	 irreducible.	
An	initial	observation	is	that	this	view,	inso-
far as it is committed to sui generis phenom-
enal	and	physical	particulars,	is	not	a	monist	
view.	Rather,	 it	 indicates	 a	 dualist	 ontology.	
This is because the purported bearer of these 
properties would not be an ontologically basic 
unit,	but	a	mereologically	complex	kind	that	
is composed of and can be broken down into 
more basic phenomenal and physical units.
In	 response,	 the	 panpsychist	 might	 suggest	
that	 these	properties	are,	by	way	of	a	neces-
sary	 connection,	 tied	 together	 so	 closely	 as	
to	 make	 them	 jointly	 constitute	 a	 single	 re-
ality,	 but	 I	 argue	 that	 this	 strategy	would	be	
problematic.  The  positing  of  a  necessary  
connection  between  these  distinct  domains  
is	precluded	by	 the	conceivability	argument,	
which is considered a key motivation for con-
sidering	 panpsychism.	 Hence,	 panpsychism	
would  undermine  itself  by  assuming  such  a  
necessary connection.  Such a purported nec-
essary connection would also be unwarranted 
and  suspiciously  ad  hoc,	 inasmuch	 as	 there	
is no other area of enquiry that requires such 
brute metaphysical necessity between distinct 
domains.	 Indeed,	 following	 David	 Hume,	 it	
is usually accepted that matters of fact which 
are not linked by identity or logical entailment 
can	only	be	contingently	related.	Even	in	the	
standard	model	of	physics,	the	most	basic	pa-
rameters are those which are not dependent on 
the values of other parameters.
The	panpsychist,	then,	is	left	to	take	the	con-
ceivability  argument  seriously  and  accept  
that  the relation between the two domains is  
contingent.  Consciousness  must  be  accepted  
as	 being	 ungrounded.	 However,	 theresult-
ing view would not be a form of monism. It  
would,	instead,	be	an	elaborate	form	of	natu-
ralistic	dualism,	according	to	which	phenom-
enal  properties  are  ubiquitously  associated  
with physical properties via contingent laws. 
The	 panpsychist’s	 world	 may	 be	 a	 world	
where all physical events are associated with 
corresponding	 phenomenal	 events,	 but	 there	
may be possible worlds in which these asso-
ciations	do	not	obtain.	And	so,	the	aforemen-
tioned trouble with positing brute metaphysi-
cal  necessity  between  distinct  domains  indi-
cates that neutral monism is false and fails to 
provide a satisfactory metaphysical underpin-
ning for panpsychism. If we accept that phe-
nomenality  and  physicality  are  ontologically  
fundamental	and	mutually	irreducible,	as	the	
panpsychist	does,	 then	we	are	accepting	that	
some form of dualism is true.
Paying	heed	to	William	of	Ockham’s	famous	
heuristic,	 the	 panpsychist	 might	 be	 disin-




A  dualist  ontology  might  be  considered  to  
defy  this  consideration  by  positing  two  con-
tingently	 related	 domains.	 However,	 I	 think	
that  the  appeal  to  parsimony fails  to  support  
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the monist rendering of panpsychism. We are 
encouraged not to postulate more entities than 
are	 required,	but	 I	argue	 that	 the	entities	are	
required	here.	As	noted	above,	 the	notion	of	
single  stuff  whose  aspects  are  connected  by  
brute metaphysical necessity would fail to ac-
count  for  the  conceivability  of  modal  varia-
tion between these two domains.  To account  
for	this,	we	need	to	posit	that	the	two	distinct	
domains	are	only	contingently	related.	Hence,	




retical  parsimony  relies  on  the  assumption  
that	 the	world	 is	 parsimonious.	 If,	 however,	
the world actually turns out not to be parsimo-
nious,	 then	 theoretical	 parsimony	would	 fail	
to be truth conducive.
This	leads	to	the	second	critical	point,	which	
is the question of why we should suppose that 
our	world	is	the	panpsychist’s	world.	By	con-
ceding that the relation between phenomenal-
ity	and	physicality	is	contingent,	we	open	up	
various  modal  possibilities  for  precisely  how 
these domains might be correlated. We can no 
longer assume that physicality and phenome-
nality are ubiquitously tied together by neces-
sity.	Rather,	in	virtue	of	these	countless	modal	
possibilities,	we	can	 take	 it	as	 true	 that	 there	
exist	infinite	 consciousnesses	across	a	plural-
ity	of	metaphysically	possible	worlds,	but	the	
ways  in  which  consciousnesses  are  distribut-
ed  in  particular  worlds  are  contingent  on  the  
characteristics of the psychophysical laws that 
obtain in those worlds. In his discussion of the 
conceivability	argument,	for	example,	Goff	en-
tertains	a	“ghost”	world	where	phenomenality	
obtains without any associated physicality and 
a	 “zombie”	 world	 where	 physicality	 obtains	
without any associated phenomenality. Given 
our	own	experiences	as	subjects	embodied	in	
biological	systems,	we	at	least	know	that	our	
world is a world where phenomenal properties 
accompany  certain  macrophysical  processes.  
However,	it	is	less	clear	why	we	should	think	
that	all	of	our	world’s	physical	processes	are	




with corresponding phenomenal events. How-
ever,	there	seems	to	be	little	reason	to	suppose	
that our world is such a world.
Although we might disagree with the overall 
metaphysical	picture	it	paints,	Consciousness 
and Fundamental Reality is an excellent book. 
Goff  has  done  a  commendable  task  of  chal-
lenging	 the	 orthodox	 view	 with	 confidence,	
clarity,	and	rigour.	The	first	 part	of	 the	book	
is altogether more persuasive than the second 
part.	In	particular,	his	revelation	argument	in	
the	first	part	is	a	valuable	addition	to	collect-
ing arguments against physicalism in the phil-
osophical  literature.  The  strongest  moments  
in  the  second part  are  his  expert  analyses  of  
the	 combination	 problem	 and	 the	 subject	 ir-
reducibility	thesis.	Ultimately,	though,	I	think	
that  his  monist  rendering  of  panpsychism  is  
unsound. If we are convinced that physicalism 
is false and needs to endorse a different posi-
tion,	we	will	do	better	by	committing	 to	 the	
more  standard  form  of  naturalistic  dualism.  
Nonetheless,	 it	 is	 a	 benefit	 of	 this	 fine	 book	
that it encourages us to take seriously the idea 
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Embodied  Cognition  and  Sport  Psychology 
brings a unique perspective and multidiscipli-
nary  approach  to  consideration  and  research  
of	 sport,	 especially	 given	 how	 this	 release	
finally	bridged	analogous	fields	of	Embodied	




volume  contains  an  introduction  and  seven  
large	sections	with	26	insightful	chapters	wri-
tten	by	69	prominent	authors,	briefly	 presen-
ted in the closing section of the book.
As	the	“intrinsically	 interdisciplinary”	scien-
ce that studies human intelligent systems and 
mental	 functions,	 while	 researching	 the	 po-
tential,	 limits,	 and	 usage	 of	 the	mind	 in	 the	
complex and sometimes extreme circumstan-
ces	of	sport,	Cognitive	Science	relies	heavily	
on sport psychology and opens up to different 
collaborations.	Thus,	most	of	the	26	chapters	
are  based  on  the  interdisciplinary  collabora-
tion  between  scholars  from  different  disci-
plines,	such	as	psychology	and	neuropsycho-
